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Summary 17 
Over US$60 trillion is predicted to be spent on new infrastructure globally by 2040. Is it possible to 18 
meet UN Sustainable Development Goal 9 (develop infrastructure networks) without sacrificing 19 
Goals 14 and 15 (ending biodiversity loss)? We explore the potential role of No Net Loss (NNL) 20 
policies in reconciling these SDGs. Assessing country-level overlaps between planned 21 
infrastructure expansion, infrastructure-threatened biodiversity, and national biodiversity 22 
compensation policies, around half of predicted infrastructure and infrastructure-threatened 23 
biodiversity falls within countries with some form of mandatory compensation policy. However, 24 
these policies currently have shortcomings, are unlikely to achieve NNL in biodiversity, and could 25 
risk doing more harm than good. We summarise policy transformations required for NNL policies 26 
to mitigate all infrastructure impacts on biodiversity. To achieve SDGs 9 alongside 14 and 15, 27 
capitalising on the global coverage of mandatory compensation policies and rapidly transforming 28 
them into robust NNL policies (emphasising impact avoidance) should be an urgent priority. 29 
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Biodiversity impacts of the global infrastructure boom 36 
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) lay out society’s ambition to deliver social and 37 
economic prosperity for all, while conserving nature on land and sea (SDGs 14 and 15 respectively). 38 
However, ‘business-as-usual’ approaches to solving social and economic development challenges 39 
may compromise our ability to achieve the SDGs that are focused on eliminating our impacts on 40 
species and ecosystems 1,2. One of these potential contradictions relates to infrastructure: is it 41 
possible to rapidly expand the world’s built infrastructural networks (SDG 9) without harming non-42 
human life on Earth (SDGs 14 and 15)? At this key juncture for the future of biodiversity, the 43 
development of the post-2020 framework for the Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD), this is a 44 
crucial question to consider. 45 
We are currently experiencing the most rapid expansion of built infrastructure in history (‘the basic 46 
physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for 47 
the operation of a society or enterprise’; Lexico Dictionaries) with over US$60 trillion of 48 
infrastructure spending predicted between 2019-2040 (estimated for 56 countries totalling 88% of 49 
global GDP)3,4. It is projected that an additional 1.2 million km2 of land will be urbanised between 50 
2000-2030 (185% increase)5, and an additional 3-4.7 million km of roads added to the global network 51 
by 2050 (22-34% increase)6. In a high-profile example, the ongoing Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ 52 
might be the most ambitious infrastructure drive in history 7. The programme aims to link 65 53 
countries, representing two-thirds of the global population, in a network of transport and energy 54 
infrastructure, spatially overlapping with 1,700 sites with conservation designations7. 55 
Infrastructural expansion can be an important mechanism for alleviating poverty and delivering 56 
economic growth 8,9, but when unaccompanied by strong environmental safeguards it is also a key 57 
global driver of biodiversity and ecosystem service loss 10,11. Major extractive, transport and energy-58 
production infrastructure projects are planned within some of the world’s most biodiverse and 59 
carbon-rich regions, including the Congo Basin, the Amazon and Borneo 10,12,13. Infrastructure can 60 
impact on biodiversity in multiple ways, including direct habitat loss within the built infrastructure 61 
footprint, alteration of ecosystem properties or fragmentation 14,15, and exacerbation of biological 62 
resource consumption 10 by facilitating further economic activity (through e.g. improving road 63 
access). At global scales, one third (9,053/27,159) of all assessed threatened species (categorised as 64 
Critically Endangered, Endangered or Vulnerable; assessed 14/6/19) on the Red List are threatened 65 
by infrastructure, including around half of all threatened amphibians and birds (55% and 46% 66 
respectively) 16. Transport, energy, and residential infrastructure are also key contributors to climate 67 
breakdown 17,18, another important driver of biodiversity loss. In addition to the considerable 68 
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biodiversity implications, much planned mining, transport and urban infrastructure is also predicted 69 
to impact heavily on areas of global ecosystem service importance 5,17,19, further exacerbating major 70 
environmental challenges including climate breakdown. 71 
 72 
Regulation of infrastructure impacts on biodiversity 73 
In committing to SDGs 14 and 15, the international community committed to ‘sustainably manage 74 
and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts’, and ‘protect and 75 
prevent the extinction of threatened species by 2020’. Given infrastructure’s role in driving 76 
biodiversity loss, it is worth asking: how close are we to achieving this aspiration for infrastructure, 77 
and what else could be done? This perspective extends the conceptual framework of a ‘global 78 
mitigation hierarchy’ outlined in Arlidge et al. (2018) 20, focusing specifically on mitigating the 79 
biodiversity impacts of infrastructural expansion. 80 
NNL policies are an increasingly influential set of policies that have emerged specifically with this 81 
aspiration at their core, to fully mitigate the biodiversity impacts of infrastructure and, in some 82 
cases, land use change. First rising to prominence in response to widespread wetland losses in the 83 
USA and loss of natural landscape aesthetic in Germany 21,22, idealised NNL policies are based on the 84 
principle that biodiversity is as a minimum left no worse off after development than before (Box 1). 85 
NNL is commonly operationalised through the application of a mitigation hierarchy to development 86 
impacts (e.g. avoid, minimise, restore, offset 23) and predicated on a strict preference for the first 87 
stage (to avoid biodiversity impacts wherever possible). Most commonly implemented through 88 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) frameworks, NNL policies considerably strengthen the 89 
treatment of biodiversity in traditional EIA. Traditional EIAs aim to assist with decision-making for 90 
developments by providing information on the predicted environmental impacts of development 91 
and potentially exploring options for mitigating some of these environmental impacts to ‘acceptable’ 92 
levels, but it is uncommon for EIAs to address impacts on biodiversity per se in quantitative terms 24. 93 
In contrast, NNL policies set a clear overall goal for biodiversity, and following the application of the 94 
mitigation hierarchy, set out in quantitative terms what actions need to be taken in order for the 95 
expected residual losses from the development to be at least matched through compensatory 96 
actions including biodiversity offsetting. They explicitly define which aspects of biodiversity are 97 
considered priorities and how they are to be measured, and quantitative targets can then be set to 98 
assess whether or not these priorities have been achieved 25. Additionally, if ecological theory 99 
determines that NNL in biodiversity cannot be achieved in a given context, NNL policies give a 100 
concrete rationale to when projects should not be permitted to go ahead 26,27. However as explored 101 
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later, these core principles often fail to be respected in practice, and the quantitative nature of NNL 102 
does not free it from the influence of uneven power dynamics or vested interests 28. Additionally, 103 
one of the main ways that principles of NNL are applied around the world is through the creation of 104 
biodiversity compensation policies, which often fall far short of the idealised application of NNL 105 
outlined above because of a lack of adherence to the mitigation hierarchy29 (especially avoidance27). 106 
 107 
Box 1. Key terms 
Biodiversity compensation – actions taken to compensate for negative impacts to biodiversity 
caused by developments, which may include financial compensation for affected stakeholders. 
Compensatory actions generate gains that are not necessarily quantified, or equivalent in type or 
magnitude to losses, and as such are more general than ‘biodiversity offsetting’. 
 
Biodiversity offsetting – actions taken to compensate fully for the residual impacts of 
development following the quantitative assessment of biodiversity losses; gains must be of 
equivalent or greater ecological value to losses. Offsetting is a ‘specific and rigorously quantified 
type of compensation measure’ 30. 
 
No Net Loss policy – policy applied at various spatial scales aiming to achieve a minimum of no net 
loss in biodiversity across all impacts of development. NNL policies are often operationalised in 
practice through application of the ‘mitigation hierarchy’. 
 
Mitigation hierarchy – a framework for mitigating biodiversity losses from development by 
sequentially avoiding biodiversity impacts wherever possible, minimising impacts where impacts 
are unavoidable, restoring following the impact if impacts are time-bound, and finally offsetting 
any residual impacts to biodiversity 31. 
 108 
 109 
Current uptake of biodiversity compensation policies 110 
To assess progress in achieving NNL of biodiversity from new infrastructure, we first explore the 111 
global extent of more general biodiversity compensation policies. Whilst much past research on 112 
compensation has focused on outcomes at local scales 32–34, the global implications of compensation 113 
policies are only just beginning to emerge. For example, taking just the subset of compensation 114 
represented by biodiversity offsets, an estimated 153,679-64,223
+25,013km2 of biodiversity offsets were (as 115 
of 2018) in the process of being implemented to offset infrastructure and land use change impacts 116 
globally, which when summed make the area of biodiversity offsets approximately equivalent in size 117 
to a country as large as Bangladesh 35. Recently, the IUCN and collaborators assembled a global 118 
database on biodiversity compensation policies, which documents at country-level (covering 197 119 
countries accounting for 98% of global GDP) the degree to which compensation policies (including 120 
but not restricted to offsets) are referenced and embedded into overarching national environmental 121 
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or EIA legislation (Box 2). This database details that compensation policies including offsetting 122 
policies are significantly more widespread than previously reported 36: 37 countries representing 123 
72% of global GDP represented in the database have mandatory compensation policies for at least 124 
certain infrastructure sectors or habitat types (Figure 1(A)), with a further 64 countries providing 125 
guidance on compensatory measures or enabling offsets as voluntary practice (‘precursor policies’). 126 
Despite widespread criticism of offsetting policies 37,38, this global policy adoption indicates that 127 
compensation policies could have an important role to play in minimising the biodiversity impacts of 128 
the ongoing global infrastructure boom 39. 129 
 130 
Box 2. The Global Inventory of Biodiversity Offset Policies 
The Global Inventory of Biodiversity Offset Policies (GIBOP) is an open-access global database 
summarising the degree to which biodiversity compensation policies (including offsetting policies) 
and the mitigation hierarchy are embedded within national environmental policy frameworks. The 
database was assembled through an analysis of 197 countries’ national environmental or EIA 
legislation, allocating each country a score representing the ‘strength’ of biodiversity 
compensation legislation. Whilst this score was allocated using a standardised process across each 
country, there remains an unavoidable interpretive element. Scores are defined as: 
0) no mention of compensation; 
1) countries at an early stage of policy development (minimal regulatory provisions on offset or 
compensation); 
2) countries enabling the use of voluntary offsets (scheme acknowledged in regulatory 
framework); 
3) countries requiring mandatory biodiversity compensation in at least some circumstances. 
More information about methods and limitations can be found at 
https://portals.iucn.org/offsetpolicy/. 
 131 
Worldwide, the dominant infrastructural threats to biodiversity are residential and commercial 132 
development, followed by mining and extraction and then other infrastructure types (linear 133 
infrastructure and energy production; Figure 1(B)). According to the Global Infrastructure Hub, 134 
US$46 trillion of infrastructure investment by 2040 (74% of predicted infrastructure investment for 135 
the 56 countries in the database) is predicted to occur in countries with mandatory compensation 136 
policies for at least some infrastructure classes or habitat types (Figure 1(C)) 3,4,29. These countries 137 
are associated with an estimated 568,000 km2 in additional urban areas (2000-2030; 47% of global 138 
total5) and over 1.5 million km of new roads (by 2050; 42% of global total6). Consequently, around 139 
half of the world’s new infrastructure up to 2040 can be expected to fall within countries with some 140 
existing form of mandatory compensation policy, and this is likely to increase as adoption of 141 
compensatory policies including biodiversity offsetting continues to spread globally. If all countries 142 
currently enabling (but not requiring) the use of various forms of biodiversity compensation as part 143 
of their impact mitigation strategies (n=64) moved to mandatory policies, this coverage would 144 
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increase considerably (e.g. an additional 35% of projected global road expansion would fall within 145 
these countries). 146 
Beyond being applicable in countries in which around half of the world’s projected infrastructure will 147 
be constructed, compensation policies also cover a sizeable proportion of the world’s biodiversity 148 
features threatened by infrastructure. We assessed the spatial overlap between infrastructure-149 
threatened bird species extant ranges (N=593, Red List accessed 14/6/19) and regions under 150 
different compensation policy strengths (Box 2), using birds to minimise assessment biases between 151 
species 40. The mean percentage of each species’ range falling in countries with mandatory 152 
compensation policies is 47%, and a further 25% falls under ‘precursor’ policies (Figure 1(D)). We 153 
note here that we are simply describing broad spatial overlaps, and not speculating about causal 154 
relationships between biodiversity and compensation policy adoption. Additionally, at the national 155 
scale the particular infrastructure impacts threatening these species may not fall under the 156 
jurisdiction of current compensation policies (e.g. if the impacts are generated by an industry which 157 
is not regulated). Nevertheless, this high-level coverage of threatened biodiversity demonstrates 158 
that compensation policies are likely to play a key role at the global scale in the conservation of 159 





Figure 1. Infrastructure-related threats to species and global coverage of biodiversity compensation policies. Policy scores 163 
(see Box 2): 3 = mandatory compensation in some contexts; 2 = enable voluntary offsetting; 1 = minimum regulatory 164 
provisions for compensation; 0 = compensation not mentioned in national policy.  A) Global map of compensation policy 165 
strength 29. B) Breakdown of the main source of infrastructural threats facing all infrastructure-threatened (CR-VU) species 166 
on the IUCN red list (N=9,059 species; pie-chart comprised of 11,475 threats, some species double-counted if facing multiple 167 
types of infrastructural threat 16). Main threats, clockwise from top: dams, residential and commercial development, mining 168 
and energy production, transport and transmission networks. C) Overlap between compensation policies 29 and different 169 
indicators of global infrastructural expansion. Top: distribution of predicted infrastructure spending 2019-2040 for 56 170 
countries accounting for 88% of global GDP 3,4. Middle: distribution of predicted road expansion by 2050 for 164 countries 6. 171 
Bottom: distribution of predicted urbanisation 2000-2030 for 189 countries 5. D) Mean overlap between extant distribution 172 
of infrastructure-threatened birds on the Red List (N=596) 41 and biodiversity compensation policies. 173 
 174 
Moving from biodiversity compensation to No Net Loss 175 
The widespread integration of biodiversity compensation requirements with national policy 176 
frameworks around the world demonstrates policy recognition of the impacts of infrastructural 177 
expansion. However, biodiversity compensation policies need to be carefully designed in order to 178 
stand a chance of achieving NNL consistent with the aspirations of the SDGs 38, and current 179 
biodiversity compensation policies often fall far short of this aspiration. The GIBOP database shows 180 
that only 23% of the countries enabling or requiring (scores 2-3) biodiversity compensation 181 
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(including offsets) require that compensation be used strictly as a ‘last resort’ after the rest of the 182 
mitigation hierarchy, and of these 101 countries, only 10% apply international best practice 183 
principles 42. These shortcomings have several implications. Using offsets or other forms of 184 
compensation without sequentially implementing the rest of the mitigation hierarchy risks 185 
permitting the loss of irreplaceable biodiversity such as slow-recovering or old-growth ecosystems or 186 
threatened species 26,43. Additionally, it risks facilitating increased damage to natural systems under 187 
the logic that offsets might be marginally cheaper than avoidance, trading certain biodiversity losses 188 
for uncertain gains 44. If NNL is to realise its potential to mitigate the impacts of the global 189 
infrastructure boom, an essential first step is therefore to transform existing biodiversity 190 
compensation policies into true NNL policies through mandatory application of preceding stages of 191 
the mitigation hierarchy, and implementation of offsets in line with social and ecological best 192 
practice rather than more general biodiversity compensation 42,45.  193 
Such an ambition is not unattainable. Best practice NNL policies applying the mitigation hierarchy 194 
already exist in 10 countries, and a substantial amount of international infrastructure investment 195 
also falls under the scope of NNL policies through safeguards associated with multilateral 196 
development financing, such as the International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standard 6 197 
(NNL for impacts to Natural Habitat and Net Gain for impacts to Critical Habitat) and World Bank’s 198 
Environmental and Social Standard 6. Similar requirements apply in the safeguard frameworks of the 199 
Asian Development Bank, Intra-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank 46. 200 
As an example of the extent of this financing, between 2015 and March 2019, the World Bank 201 
committed US$83 billion to built infrastructure development projects, of which 81% was invested in 202 
countries without mandatory NNL policies (data from World Bank 2019). Major infrastructure 203 
projects funded by the World Bank are required (at least in theory) to meet ecological outcomes 204 
which are ‘materially consistent’ with their own NNL policies 48. In addition to multilateral financing, 205 
major private financing sources mandate NNL implicitly under the Equator Principles (a risk 206 
management framework for managing socio-environmental risks of project finance, adopted by 97 207 
financial institutions worldwide), which commits them to the International Finance Corporation 208 
performance standards including Performance Standard 649. Eighty percent of project finance 209 
transactions in emerging markets are now associated with banks that have adopted the Equator 210 
Principles 49, although considerable further reforms are needed to enhance implementation of the 211 
principles 50. 212 
The combination of national compensation policies and multi-lateral policy coverage indicate that 213 
enhancing biodiversity compensation policies to aim for NNL could provide a key tool for mitigating 214 
the impacts of the global infrastructure boom. But we argue below that if even existing ‘best-215 
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practice’ NNL policies are to fulfil their potential there is need for a rapid, transformational 216 
improvement in their application and effectiveness, or they risk undermining biodiversity 217 
conservation outcomes overall. 218 
 219 
Expanding the scope of No Net Loss policies 220 
Many NNL policies have historically failed to achieve their intended overarching policy aim 34: 221 
shortcomings are embedded into multiple stages of the NNL policy implementation process from 222 
policy down to project scales (Figure 2). Perhaps the most important limitation to most existing NNL 223 
policies is that the total infrastructural impacts under their jurisdiction tend to be highly constrained 224 
– often the majority of impacts fall outside the scope of existing regulation (referred to by Maron et 225 
al. (2018) 38 as Type 2 impacts; Table 1; Figure 2). If NNL is only applied to a subsection of impacts, 226 
then even if project-scale mitigation is achieved the policy will inevitably oversee landscape-scale 227 
declines in biodiversity 34,38. There are two main sources of unmitigated infrastructural impacts: 228 
deliberate policy choices that leave particular sets of impacts either entirely unaddressed or granted 229 
special exemptions from regulation, and illegal, uncompliant or unreported impacts.  230 
 231 
 232 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the embedded failures to address biodiversity losses from new infrastructure in each 233 
implementation stage of the mitigation hierarchy as currently applied in NNL policies. Light green box (top) denotes failures 234 
to address the full suite of infrastructure impacts on biodiversity impacts at the policy-scale, darker box (bottom) outlines 235 
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failures to address biodiversity loss embedded at project-scale applications of the mitigation hierarchy. Type 2 impacts as 236 
referred to by Maron et al. (2018)38 are impacts which do not come under the scope of existing NNL policies, reflected by 237 
the ‘unregulated impacts’ and ‘exemptions’ categories. The size of the boxes is arbitrary and likely highly context-specific, so 238 
we have insufficient information to demonstrate the relative importance of each of the shortcomings in NNL application at 239 
this time 240 
 241 
 242 
Case study Policy context Total impacts captured by NNL 
Wetlands in Florida, 
USA (2001-2011) 51 
National policy goal of no net loss in ‘wetland 
acreage and function’ 52. Compensatory mitigation 
allows for compensation for wetland impacts 21. 
Mitigation banking is the legislatively favoured and 
most widely used compensation mechanism 
Mitigation banking (which captures 
most but not all wetland 
compensation) restored 58,575 ha 
across the study region, but overall 
Florida experienced a net loss of over 
56,000 ha wetlands across the study 
period 
Wetlands in 20 
counties in North 
Carolina, USA (1994-
2001) 53 
As above 4,591 ha and 68 ha of wetlands were 
restored and created respectively 
across the study period, whilst the 
net loss of wetlands was 25,303 ha 









National Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation (EPBC) Act aims to protect ‘Matters of 
National Environmental Significance’, which 
includes threatened species. Where an action might 
impact on ‘Matters of Environmental Significance’, a 
referral to regulators is necessary, and if found to 
have a significant impact, offsets may be mandated. 
Simultaneously, Queensland has the Vegetation 
Management Act (VMA), which aims to maintain 
biodiversity and ecological processes through 
regulation of vegetation clearing 
631,000 ha of potential black-
throated finch habitat (which should 
have counted as a ‘Matter of 
Environmental Significance’ because 
of the finch’s threat status) was 
cleared across the study period. Of 
this, 502,391 ha was not associated 
with a known referral under the EPBC 
act, despite that the majority was 
likely cleared for pasture and thus 
subject to a referral 
Native vegetation in 
New South Wales, 
Australia (2005-2015) 
54 
Aim of New South Wales Native Vegetation Act is to 
‘prevent broad-scale clearing unless it improves or 
maintains environmental outcomes’. Offsetting is 
one mechanism mandated by the policy 
Policy included exemptions that 
enabled circa 87% of vegetation 
clearing to occur uncompensated 
Table 1. Case study examples of the disparity between total infrastructure or land use change impacts and those impacts 243 
which are subject to NNL (indicated in the above cases by the degree of offsetting relative to habitat loss) 244 
 245 
All biodiversity impact mitigation policy has limitations to its coverage: mitigation policy commonly 246 
applies to either a subsection of biodiversity (i.e. only particular habitat types or legal designations: 247 
e.g. Indonesian forest policy requires compensation for losses from deforestation of state forests), 248 
or a subsection of industries (e.g. Mongolia requires compensation for damages associated with 249 
mining, petroleum and mineral extraction projects). However, as the evidence grows for the 250 
biodiversity and ecosystem service value of habitats that have not classically received much 251 
protection, such as isolated habitat fragments 55, urban nature 56 and abandoned land 57, allowing 252 
unmitigated biodiversity loss across any habitats now seems increasingly incompatible with 253 
achieving a minimum of NNL of biodiversity at landscape scales 58. Additionally, even when 254 
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regulation should in theory apply, many regions grant exemptions for specific infrastructure 255 
developments deemed to be strategically important, reflecting an underlying political prioritisation 256 
of economic over biodiversity values. For example, numerous national governments have 257 
circumvented the EU Habitats Directive’s nominal NNL policy for the Natura 2000 network of 258 
protected areas by arguing that the associated infrastructures are in the ‘overriding public interest’, 259 
granting them an exemption even though the justifications for this designation often fall far short of 260 
what is legally required 59. Additionally, many impacts are implicitly exempted from policies if they 261 
are deemed not to exceed certain impact ‘significance’ thresholds, which can often be arbitrary or 262 
overruled on arbitrary grounds60,61. According to government consultation documents, the proposed 263 
approach to mandate Biodiversity Net Gain in England comes close to covering all infrastructure 264 
impacts 62. Under the proposals, developments will be required to deliver an improvement in 265 
biodiversity (as measured by the UK Department for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs 266 
biodiversity metric 63) consistent with good practice principles 64.  However, even this policy 267 
acknowledges that certain developments are, at this stage, exempt such as ‘nationally significant 268 
infrastructure’ and ‘permitted development’ 62. These developments will still adhere to existing UK 269 
laws to protect biodiversity, but these laws give consent for developments to proceed with 270 
biodiversity loss. 271 
The second major reason why biodiversity loss from infrastructure falls outside the jurisdiction of 272 
NNL policy is that many impacts are illegal or unreported. For example, in Queensland, Australia the 273 
majority of potential black-throated finch habitat cleared between 2000-2016 was not associated 274 
with a referral under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (a prerequisite 275 
to the application of the mitigation hierarchy), implying that landholders were not reporting their 276 
land clearing 43. In the Brazilian Amazon, approximately 80% of roads are constructed without 277 
government approval, and are therefore not subject to environmental regulations 65. Improving 278 
compliance with and enforcement of environmental regulation is a monumental task, which is far 279 
from limited to NNL policies 66. 280 
 281 
Project-scale implementation and compliance challenges 282 
Even if all infrastructure impacts were fully captured within NNL policy, biodiversity still falls through 283 
multiple cracks in the application of the mitigation hierarchy at project scales, both in the 284 
implementation of the avoidance and minimisation steps, and the design and implementation of 285 
offsetting policies (Figure 2). One overarching technical issue is the choice of biodiversity metric to 286 
use in impact assessment processes: metrics are simplified representations of the complex 287 
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phenomenon of biodiversity, and so aspects of biodiversity that are not explicitly integrated into the 288 
metric risk falling outside the project planning process (reviewed comprehensively elsewhere25,67,68).  289 
The avoidance step is widely considered the most important, yet understudied, step of the 290 
mitigation hierarchy 21,27. Empirical evidence for the effectiveness of avoidance is severely lacking 291 
(but see Pascoe et al. (2019)69), and empirically challenging because in some systems much 292 
avoidance occurs through unobservable informal communications between developers and 293 
regulators, and so the final number of development permits accepted or rejected is a misleading 294 
proxy for effectiveness 70. However, it is clear that many infrastructure projects that receive approval 295 
and proceed would not pass simple cost-benefit tests if all negative, long-term, direct and indirect 296 
social, environmental and maintenance costs were accounted for 10. Furthermore, proper 297 
application of the mitigation hierarchy implies that any impacts to irreplaceable biodiversity must be 298 
avoided 26; yet, some NNL policies continue to facilitate the clearance of threatened species habitat 299 
even when it simply cannot be justified on conservation grounds because it is non-offsettable and 300 
risks causing local extinction 43.  301 
Avoidance fails to be implemented satisfactorily for many reasons (reviewed in Phalan et al. 2018) 27, 302 
including capacity shortages in public bodies responsible for assessing alternative options, and 303 
political prioritisation of economic development over environmental outcomes that often renders 304 
‘no project’ scenarios politically undesirable and undervalues long-term socio-environmental costs 305 
27,71. Compounding this, EIA processes are often implemented too late in the project planning 306 
process to exert significant influence over key aspects of project design such as location, as 307 
considerable project costs and planning effort have already accrued 72,73. Corruption and uneven 308 
power dynamics can also play a role 28,74. Situations where groups with a vested interest in 309 
development proceeding hold undue influence over the mitigation hierarchy process are 310 
commonplace in EIAs through which many NNL systems are implemented 75. For example, in some 311 
countries companies commissioning EIAs from consultants are permitted to withhold payment until 312 
the EIA is delivered, thus holding leverage over consultants to incentivise favourable EIA reports that 313 
underestimate negative biodiversity impacts and thus the degree of avoidance required 74. 314 
Application of avoidance can also be suppressed by governments if they perceive strong geopolitical 315 
incentives to promote infrastructure development. For example, dam construction in the Brazilian 316 
Amazon cannot be reconciled with achieving NNL in biodiversity 12,76,77, however, the government 317 
perceives access to hydroelectric energy to be a geopolitical priority that supersedes avoiding 318 
impacts to irreplaceable biodiversity 78,79. 319 
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Once the avoidance and minimisation steps of the mitigation hierarchy have been applied, any 320 
residual impacts of infrastructure on biodiversity are then mitigated through offset policy, with any 321 
failures to apply the first two stages of the hierarchy adequately manifesting in additional residual 322 
impacts. Losses continue to occur under offsetting policies because of poor offset policy design 38, 323 
failure to implement the required offsets 80, and finally through failures of the offsetting 324 
interventions themselves34. There are multiple design issues that can embed biodiversity losses into 325 
NNL policies (reviewed in Maron et al. (2018)38), for example when unrealistic counterfactuals are 326 
used which imply that unfeasibly high rates of loss would have happened in the absence of the 327 
policy 81,82, when offsets do not provide any additionality 33, or when there is a lack of accounting for 328 
time lags between development losses and offset ecological improvements 54.  329 
However, even NNL policies that adequately address the theoretical ecological requirements for 330 
achieving NNL risk suffering from a number of implementation problems that plague many 331 
environmental policies and conservation interventions. A key difficulty is that offsets are often very 332 
challenging to organise logistically and contractually 83. Habitat-based offsets often require the 333 
acquisition or conservation management of land that would otherwise not have been contributing to 334 
conservation to the same degree. Offsets may be hard to find because landholders are unwilling to 335 
restrict their management rights 84, or because enough suitable land is simply unavailable (e.g. in 336 
Sabah, Malaysia 85 or France 86), and instances of land scarcity are likely to increase in the future. 337 
This may drive greater emphasis in future on non-site based offsets (e.g. behaviour change 338 
interventions to reduce biodiversity loss). Whether site-based or not, offsets have tended to suffer 339 
from persistent implementation failures, related to weak compliance or regulatory enforcement, 340 
and inconsistencies within interacting governance arrangements 80,83. At global scales, there are 341 
considerable gaps between offset policy and implementation: in 60% of countries that have some 342 
form of mandatory biodiversity compensation policy there is no documented evidence of a single 343 
offset yet being implemented according to the world’s most comprehensive global offset database 344 
(Figure 3) 35. In these countries, ecosystem loss continues to proceed without proper compensation. 345 
Lastly, even if conservation interventions are implemented in line with offset obligations, incomplete 346 
understanding of restoration ecology or the effectiveness of the implemented offset actions can lead 347 





Figure 3.  Global disparities between biodiversity compensation policy commitments and offset implementation 29,35, with 351 
the boxplots denoting the total number of offsets recorded as implemented in each country, and the map highlighting 352 
countries with no recorded implementation of offsets despite policy commitments. Policy scores (see Box 2): 3 = mandatory 353 
compensation in some contexts; 2 = enable voluntary offsetting; 1 = minimum regulatory provisions for compensation; 0 = 354 
compensation not mentioned in national policy. A) Box and whisker plots showing upper and lower quartiles and medians 355 
of the number of offsets implemented globally under different policy strengths. Crosses denote sample means (adjacent to 356 
x-axis for policy strength values 2-0). Whiskers denote the minimum/maximum values that fall within the lower/upper 357 
bound of the interquartile range -/+ 1.5* interquartile range. Outliers falls outside that range. B) Map of global biodiversity 358 
compensation policies strengths and evidence for offset implementation (defined as the presence of at least 1 offset or a 359 
non-zero area of offset implementation in-country from the most comprehensive global offset implementation database 35). 360 
Note that offset implementation displayed may be the result of national policy, voluntary commitments or international 361 
financing requirements 362 
 363 
The future of No Net Loss 364 
Over the last decade, there has been fierce debate about the merits of NNL and biodiversity 365 
offsetting and the degree to which it can help achieve or potentially unintentionally undermine 366 
conservation outcomes 37,88,89. Empirical explorations of unintended outcomes remain scarce and 367 
largely inconclusive so far (e.g. no evidence for 'license to trash' in Levrel et al. (2017) or Gibbons et 368 
al. (2018) 51,54); nevertheless, there is clearly in some contexts merit to the idea that NNL and 369 
offsetting policies have been designed by policymakers and influenced by the private sector to ‘sell’ 370 
the narrative that infrastructural expansion and environmental protection can go hand-in-hand 75,90, 371 
without deep reflection on the considerable barriers to achieving true NNL in practice or the place-372 
based nature of biodiversity and cultural value 37,89. There are also legitimate concerns that 373 
governments may use offset systems as excuses to reduce their own spending on conservation 374 
(‘cost-shifting’88); and that offsetting masks the fundamentally political assertion that infrastructure 375 
expansion is desirable even in wealthy countries despite that we already risk overshooting on 376 
planetary boundaries and that further economic expansion does not necessarily yield wellbeing 377 
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increases 89,91. The social justice of current NNL policies has also been rightfully questioned, with 378 
evidence that the most marginalised people tend to be those who bear the largest livelihood costs 379 
and see fewest benefits from offset delivery 92 – for offsets to be ecologically successful and socially 380 
defensible, these shortcomings must be addressed through improved legitimate community 381 
participation in both infrastructure and offset planning and negotiation processes 45. These criticisms 382 
point to the risk that poorly designed and implemented NNL and offsetting policies could do more 383 
harm than good for conservation and people. However, enthusiastic uptake of compensation 384 
policies by policymakers does create a large opportunity for conservation globally: if implementation 385 
is improved and the benefits of NNL can be maximised, then NNL is potentially an avenue to 386 
mitigating damage on natural systems caused by trillions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure, in 387 
addition to efficiently addressing global gaps in conservation financing through ‘polluter-pays’ 90. To 388 
achieve this potential, the points of failure in each stage of the infrastructural impact mitigation 389 
process need to be addressed.   390 
In order to make progress towards achieving NNL at policy scales, the jurisdiction of NNL policies 391 
must be expanded across all impacts (converting Type 2 into Type 1 impacts 38) and exemptions from 392 
NNL requirements eliminated. As a first step, we recommend that countries audit their recent 393 
infrastructure impacts, assess what proportion of these came under NNL policy, and identify the 394 
main reasons for disparities between total and potentially mitigated impacts. This can help highlight 395 
the exact policies and exemptions that facilitate the loss of biodiversity from infrastructure 396 
development. The enduring problem of limiting illegal infrastructure and biodiversity impacts is key. 397 
This remains an enormous challenge, but emerging technologies allowing for near real-time 398 
monitoring of land use change may be an important component of the solution 93. 399 
NNL may be intrinsically unfeasible for projects that damage invaluable or irreplaceable 400 
biodiversity26. NNL policies thus need to define ‘no go’ situations, and ensure that these are 401 
integrated with, and do not undermine, existing strict protections (although in practice, such 402 
protections are often over-ridden where projects are considered economic or political imperatives: 403 
e.g. dams in megadiverse tropical forest regions76). It is necessary to enhance macro-scale avoidance 404 
through strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment, integrating development objectives and 405 
systematic conservation planning to clearly highlight where impacts to biodiversity must be avoided, 406 
such as in South Africa’s planning policy and biodiversity offsetting implementation strategy 94. 407 
Additionally, there are ecosystem-specific constraints on whether policies requiring NNL at project 408 
scales can achieve NNL at the landscape level. In biodiverse, spatially-constrained regions 409 
undergoing rapid infrastructure growth there may simply be insufficient space for the offsets 410 
required85. NNL at the landscape level requires habitat restoration to compensate for project 411 
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damage, so may also be unachievable in ecosystems where restoration is very slow or otherwise 412 
unfeasible95. In such situations, policies can nevertheless set project compensation requirements so 413 
that biodiversity remains above a set threshold at the landscape level (Simmonds et al. in review; 414 
Maron et al. in review). 415 
At project scales, NNL will only be achieved if the incentives of the actors in the system are aligned. 416 
NNL needs to be set as a project deliverable from the start of the project lifecycle and the project 417 
designed in ways that make tangible, measurable and meaningful outcomes for both biodiversity 418 
and for people64. Governments need to set clear and well-enforced NNL legislation, to ensure that 419 
developers seeking to deliver NNL are not undercut by competition. Developers need to be 420 
incentivised to achieve NNL by being convinced that positive biodiversity impacts do deliver social 421 
license to operate and competitive advantage. Commissioners of new infrastructure must 422 
demonstrate that they truly value those biodiversity outcomes. 423 
Unfortunately, in many countries these conditions are not present. Central to the misapplication of 424 
NNL policy is the underlying political philosophy that short-term economic and security 425 
considerations outweigh long-term environmental ones. It is hard to address this in democracies 426 
through improved regulatory procedures or transparency; political philosophies will only shift when 427 
underlying cultures – voters and their values – change to demand these alternative priorities. 428 
However, good policy can help constrain gross violations by setting clear boundaries that cannot be 429 
overstepped without triggering comprehensive public scrutiny. NNL policy can potentially play an 430 
important role by clarifying what is and is not acceptable at both the avoidance and offsetting 431 
stages. For example, the IFC’s guidance note for Performance Standard 6 very clearly states that no 432 
financing will be permitted for projects that impact UNESCO World Heritage Sites, or sites fitting the 433 
designation criteria of the Alliance for Zero Extinction 96. Clear boundaries such as these should help 434 
constrain some of the worst potential outcomes of NNL policies if implementation standards still fall 435 
short.  436 
There are multiple more specific policy enhancements that could help deliver NNL across 437 
infrastructure impacts. To improve implementation of the first step of the mitigation hierarchy, 438 
more resources are needed for planners, with an amelioration of power imbalances that distort 439 
planning processes. This is politically challenging, but simply providing environmental information 440 
consistent with the ‘rational decision-making’ model is unlikely to deliver adequate avoidance 72: 441 
more systemic changes to planning systems are necessary. These include ensuring that information 442 
on biodiversity risks is genuinely provided early enough in the project planning process for ‘no-443 
project’ to be a seriously considered option; severing the leverage of developers over the 444 
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assessment of potential impacts (potentially through the establishment of independent public 445 
impact assessors61), and improving resourcing for planning departments so that they can cope with 446 
their case load in areas of rapid development 97. To improve the capacity of planners overseeing NNL 447 
systems, a portion of offset financing should be reinvested in strengthening institutional capacity 448 
and developing the biodiversity information base (including high-quality baseline biodiversity data), 449 
helping improve the effectiveness of biodiversity planning and NNL policies over time.  450 
Finally, there are many ways to improve design of offset systems, so as to mitigate the residual 451 
impacts of infrastructure expansion. It is necessary to design policy so that NNL is at least 452 
theoretically achievable at programme and landscape, not just project scales 38, which requires 453 
integrating state-of-the-art understanding of multipliers, time lags, biodiversity metrics, and 454 
cumulative impacts (not just cumulative impacts of portfolios of infrastructure projects, but also 455 
considering the way that infrastructure might interact with other drivers of biodiversity loss such as 456 
climate breakdown) 54,67,81,98. Gaining the acceptance and support of local communities is essential to 457 
the success of conservation interventions, and offsetting is no exception: ecological and social 458 
outcomes would be considerably improved if offsets ensured that nobody affected by the initial 459 
development and paired offset was worse off as a result of the development-offset pairing than in 460 
their absence 45. Using the best available evidence for the success of the implemented offset 461 
interventions is also essential to achieving NNL, and resources for supporting local-scale evidence-462 
based restoration initiatives are growing (e.g. Conservation Evidence 463 
(www.conservationevidence.com)). Monitoring and evaluation should be central to offset systems, 464 
with outcomes fed back into processes for synthesising evidence so that the effectiveness of 465 
ecological enhancement and restoration can be improved over time. Additionally, measures must be 466 
put into place to address the identified global gap between the policy and implementation of 467 
biodiversity offsets (Figure 3). Again, an important solution may well be capacity-building and 468 
enhanced powers and independence of regulatory bodies. There are very few recorded examples of 469 
developers receiving financial penalties for failing to achieve their biodiversity offset obligations 99. 470 
Thus, a simple step likely to improve compliance would be to increase the powers of regulators to 471 
prosecute non-compliance. In the context of other environmental policies this is shown to improve 472 
compliance not just within the firms prosecuted but more broadly across polluting industries 100.  473 
If expanding the world’s infrastructure networks is socially desirable, can it be done in a way that 474 
meets SDGs 9, 14 and 15 simultaneously? Not if business-as-usual environmental practices continue 475 
during the ongoing expansion of the global infrastructure networks. However, existing biodiversity 476 
compensation policies could feasibly be transformed into robust NNL policies to close this gap. 477 
Enthusiastic policy uptake globally has created an opportunity to limit further extensive damage to 478 
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biodiversity, if policy design and implementation can be improved. Transforming the scope and 479 
implementation of biodiversity compensation policies (and especially emphasising avoidance of 480 
irreversible impacts) should therefore be considered a global policy priority, with potential for 481 
integration into the post-2020 framework of the CBD. 482 
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